In each round, each of two firms sequentially chooses output of a homogenous good (direct flights). The firm choosing first (LeadAir) knows that the second-moving firm (FollowAir) will learn the leader’s output choice before choosing its output. Market price is determined by a linear demand curve. At the end of each round, each firm learns market production and price and both firms’ profits.
/ Stackelberg Competition
- All Games
- Behavioral Economics – Course Guide
- Business School Game Catalog
- CoreEconomics by Eric Chiang – Textbook Guide
- Economics – Textbook Guide
- Economics – Textbook Guide
- Economics by Arthur O’Sullivan, Steven Sheffrin & Stephen Perez – Textbook Guide
- Economics by Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson & John List – Textbook Guide
- Economics by Glenn Hubbard & Anthony O’Brien – Textbook Guide
- Economics by Paul Krugman and Robin Wells – Textbook Guide
- Economics for Today – Textbook Guide
- Economics, Principles and Policy – Textbook Guide
- Economics, Private and Public Choice – Textbook Guide
- Economics: Principles, Problems, & Policies – Textbook Guide
- Environmental Economics – Course Guide
- Experimental Economics – Course Guide
- Game Catalog for Economics
- Game Theory – Course Guide
- Games, Strategies, and Decision Making by Joseph E Harrington – Topic Coverage
- High School Game Catalog
- Industrial Organization – Course Guide
- Intermediate Microeconomics – Course Guide
- Intermediate Microeconomics and Its Application – Textbook Guide
- Intermediate Microeconomics by Hal R Varian – Textbook Guide
- Management: Organizational Behavior – Course Guide
- Managerial Economics – Course Guide
- Managerial Economics by William Samuelson & Stephen Marks – Textbook Guide
- Microeconomics and Behavior by Robert Frank – Textbook Guide
- Microeconomics by Austan Goolsbee, Steven Levitt & Chad Syverson – Textbook Guide
- Microeconomics by Robert Pindyck and Daniel Rubinfeld – Textbook Guide
- Modern Principles of Economics by Tyler Cowen & Alex Tabarrok – Textbook Guide
- Money and Banking – Course Guide
- Principles of Economics – Textbook Guide
- Principles of Economics by Dirk Mateer & Lee Coppock – Textbook Guide
- Principles of Economics by Dirk Mateer and Lee Coppock – Textbook Guide
- Principles of Economics by N. Gregory Mankiw – Textbook Guide
- Principles of Macroeconomics – Course Guide
- Principles of Microeconomics – Course Guide
- Public Economics – Course Guide
- Sports Economics – Course Guide
- Survey of Economics – Textbook Guide
- The Economy – Textbook Guide
- The Economy Today – Textbook Guide
- Suggest a Game
In groups of any size, students are bidders in a descending clock auction. Each bidder knows only her own private value. The price gradually descends, and a bidder can win the item by being the first to claim it. The winner pays the price at which she claimed the item.
This game demonstrates to students the workings of a descending clock auction, as used by the Dutch Flower Markets since the 1600s, and shows students the equivalence between this auction and a first-price auction.
In groups of two, students must simultaneously decide to play one of four actions in the Min Max game. The intersection of their chosen actions determines the students’ payoffs.
This game teaches students about zero sum games, and the importance of playing mixed strategies in order for your play to be unpredictable. The row student “wins” by matching jokers or mismatching numbers, while the column student wins by mismatching a joker or matching numbers. Therefore, the best strategy is to randomize one’s behavior in a special way that guarantees the highest expected payoff.
In groups of two, students must simultaneously decide to play one of two actions in the Battle of the Sexes game: Concert or Play. The intersection of their chosen actions determines the students’ payoffs.
This is a coordination game. Both students want to match the action of the other student, but one prefers Concert and the other Play. Interesting fair and efficient patterns of behavior often emerge when the game is repeated between the same pair, such as alternation between the Concert and Play equilibria (turn-taking). Miscoordination is common when pairings change over time.
In groups of any size, students participate in an R&D race (all-pay sealed bid auction). Each participant knows only her own private value for the project and chooses an amount to invest once simultaneously with other students. The participant with the highest investment wins the race and gets her value, however all participants have to pay for their investments.
This game teaches students about all-pay auctions and how they can be thought of as representing Research and Development (R&D) races. It can be used to explore other scenarios all-pay auctions apply, such as raising money for a charity event.
In groups of any size, students are bidders in a one-shot sealed bid auction. Each bidder knows only her own signal about the common value and enters a bid simultaneously with other bidders. The bidder with the highest bid wins and pays according to the pricing rule.
This game teaches students why bidders are susceptible to the winner’s curse in common value auctions. It can also illustrate how to mitigate overestimation by shading one’s bid, and allow one to explore how different price rules affect bidding behavior.
In the hide and seek game, students decide individually where to hide a coin in one of four locations with the goal of hiding it in a place where others will not find it. Then, students chose a place where they believe most of their peers have hidden their coins.
This game teaches students about framing effects and the possible breakdowns of mixed strategies under visual distractions such as edge effects and color.
In groups of two, students must simultaneously decide to play one of two actions in the Stag Hunt game: Stag or Hare. The intersection of their chosen actions determines the students’ payoffs.
This is a famous coordination game that teaches students about strategic uncertainty, and provides an example of multiple equilibria in games. Stag is a risky strategy that only gives a high payoff if the other student chooses it too. Hare guarantees a medium payoff. Stag-Stag is the more efficient Nash equilibrium, but exposes players to risk. Hare-Hare is an inefficient Nash equilibrium, but is safe.
Players are placed in pairs: one player is the Proposer, the other the Responder. The Proposer proposes a split $100. If the Responder accepts the proposal, payoffs are determined by the accepted proposal. If the Responder rejects the proposal, both earn nothing.
This game teaches students about how social norms such as fairness and altruism may result in behaviors that deviate from game-theoretic predictions.
This game differs from our standard Ultimatum Game in three ways. First, every player plays both as a Proposer and a Responder. Second, Responders indicate the smallest offer they would accept rather than accepting or rejecting a known offer. Finally, total payoffs are the sum of payoffs as Proposer and payoffs as Responder, with each player’s offer being matched with every player’s smallest acceptable offer.